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Contributions à l'analyse économique des organisations.

Abstract : The thesis uses the framework of the agency theory to investigate some issues concerning executive compensation. It is made up of a general introduction to the field and four contributions. The first contribution shows that for a firm, contrary to what the information principle points out, public trading can be prejudicial to executives incentives: in a repeated moral hazard framework with limited liability of the agent, the observability of an interim signal induce the agent to prefer a bad interim outcome when it is associated with a deterioration of the monitoring technology of the second period. It can therefore be better for the firm to not be listed and to use only the final audit of the result to monitor the executive. The second contribution points out that relative performance evaluation induces executives to adopt inefficient strategies when the demand is uncertain: they will neglect to investigate the level of demand even though this information is valuable. At the equilibrium, optimal contracts will exhibit less relative evaluation compared to a standard situation with a demand perfectly known ex-ante. In the third contribution we study the use of deferred compensation by firms and particularly the utilization of bonus banks, often recommended to bypass the side effects usually found in incentives schemes. We show, within a two period model, that contrary to what this literature puts forward, this tool does not offer any advantage relatively to other deferred compensation tools often less risky. The fourth contribution investigates the implementation of a bonus scheme based on the EVA (economic value added). Despite the broad diffusion of the concept, little empirical research has been carried out on this subject. The study points out two important results: first the great volatility of EVA compared to the external standard which is usually associated with it (MVA); secondly the difficulty to decentralize the indicator and the standard into the firm hinders strongly the theoretical advantages of the approach regarding congruence.
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  • HAL Id : pastel-00000978, version 1



François Larmande. Contributions à l'analyse économique des organisations.. Economies et finances. Ecole Polytechnique X, 2003. Français. ⟨pastel-00000978⟩



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