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Essais en Théorie des Organisations : Incitations et Structure des Organisations

Abstract : This thesis treats three subjects of theory of organizations. At first, we study the impact of changes in the institutional environment and characteristics of the labor market on the structure of organizations, and how these evolutions in turn allocate the employment and the salaries. This is made within the framework of a model of balance on the labor market, where the structure of organizations is endogenous and the production is organized in hierarchies based on knowledge. Then, we study the shape of the optimal incentive contract when the employees are heterogeneous and their performance is not verifiable. We show that the employer can motivate the agents by using simultaneously a fixed salary with the threat of redundancy in case of failure and a bonus based on the performance. The relative part of each of these two tools in the optimal contract depends on the heterogeneousness of the employees, on their hoped productivity, but also on the rate of belch
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Submitted on : Wednesday, July 21, 2010 - 1:33:49 PM
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  • HAL Id : pastel-00003401, version 1



Radoslava Nikolova. Essais en Théorie des Organisations : Incitations et Structure des Organisations. Sciences de l'Homme et Société. ENSAE ParisTech; Université Montpellier I, 2007. Français. ⟨pastel-00003401⟩



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