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6 Essais sur les enchères: Approches théorique et empirique. Application aux marches de l'électricité.

Abstract : This thesis is devoted to a theoretical and empirical analysis of auction mechanisms. Motivated by allocation issues in network industries, in particular by the liberalization of the electricity sector, it focus on auctions with externalities (either allocative or informational) and on multi-objects auctions. After an introduction which provides a survey of the use and the analysis of auctions in power markets, six chapters constitues this thesis. The first one considers standard auctions in Milgrom-Weber's model with interdependent valuations when the seller can not commit not to participate in the auction. The second and third chapters study the combinatorial auction mechanism proposed by Ausubel and Milgrom. The first of these two studies proposes a modification of this format with a final discount stage and clarifies the theoretical status of those formats, in particular the conditions such that truthful reporting is a dominant strategy. Motivated by the robustness issues of the generalizations of the Ausubel-Milgrom and the Vickrey combinatorial auctions to environments with allocative externalities between joint-purchasers, the second one characterizes the buyer-submodularity condition in a general model with allocative identity-dependent externalities between purchasers. In a complete information setup, the fourth chapter analyses the optimal design problem when the commitment abilities of the principal are reduced, namely she can not commit to a simultaneous participation game. The fifth chapter is devoted to the structural analysis of the private value auction model for a single-unit when the econometrician can not observe bidders' identities. The asymmetric independent private value (IPV) model is identified. A multi-step kernel-based estimator is proposed and shown to be asymptotically optimal. Using auctions data for the anglo-french electric interconnector, the last chapter analyses a multi-unit ascending auctions through reduced forms.
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Submitted on : Tuesday, June 17, 2008 - 8:00:00 AM
Last modification on : Friday, August 5, 2022 - 2:49:41 PM
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  • HAL Id : pastel-00003797, version 1



Laurent Lamy. 6 Essais sur les enchères: Approches théorique et empirique. Application aux marches de l'électricité.. Sciences de l'Homme et Société. Ecole des Ponts ParisTech, 2007. Français. ⟨pastel-00003797⟩



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