B. Générale-schiantarelli, Regulation and investment, EPR Discussion Paper No, 2003.

A. Alesina, H. Et, and . Rosenthal, Partisan politics, divided government and the economy, 1995.

M. Abdala, Institutions, contracts and regulation of infrastructure in Argentina, Journal of Applied Economics, vol.4, issue.2, pp.217-254, 2001.

J. Abel, M. Et, and . Clements, Entry under asymmetric regulation, Review of Industrial Organization, vol.19, issue.2, pp.227-242, 2001.
DOI : 10.1023/A:1011184100043

W. Abernathy and K. Clark, Innovation: Mapping the winds of creative destruction, Research Policy, vol.14, issue.1, pp.3-22, 1985.
DOI : 10.1016/0048-7333(85)90021-6

A. Afonso, C. Et, and . Scaglioni, An assessment of telecommunications regulation performance in the European Union, Working Papers, 2006.

C. Ai, S. Martinez, and D. Sappington, Incentive Regulation and Telecommunications Service Quality, Journal of Regulatory Economics, vol.19, issue.4, pp.263-285, 2004.
DOI : 10.1007/s11149-004-7551-6

A. D. Et and R. Feinberg, Entry in local telecommunications markets, Review of Industrial Organization, vol.25, pp.107-127, 2004.

I. Alexander, C. Mayer, and H. Weeds, Regulatory structure and risk: an International comparison, 1996.

L. Andres, J. Guash, M. Diop, and S. Lopez-azumendi, Assessing the governance of electricity regulatory agencies in the Latin American and Caribbean region, 2007.

R. Aoki and J. Small, The economics of number portability: switching costs and twopart tariffs, 1999.

J. Arhens, Governance and economic development, a comparative institutional approach, 2002.

M. Armstrong, Network Interconnection in Telecommunications, The Economic Journal, vol.108, issue.448, pp.545-564, 1998.
DOI : 10.1111/1468-0297.00304

M. Armstrong, D. Et, and . Sappington, Regulation, Competition, and Liberalization, Journal of Economic Literature, vol.44, issue.2, pp.325-366, 2006.
DOI : 10.1257/jel.44.2.325

URL : http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.177.4173

M. Armstrong, D. Et, and . Sappington, Recent developments in the theory of regulation, Handbook of Industrial Organization, 2005.

K. Arrow, The organization of economic activity: issues pertinent to the choice of market versus non market allocation, Public expenditure and policy analysis, pp.67-81, 1970.

K. Arrow, The Potentials and Limits of the Market in Resource Allocation, Issues in Contemporary, 1985.
DOI : 10.1007/978-1-349-06876-0_2

R. Baldwin, M. Et, and . Cave, Understanding regulation: theory, strategy and practice, Oxford anque Mondiale Regulatory trends in service convergence. and legislative choice, Rand Journal of Economics, vol.20, issue.8, pp.467-477, 1999.
DOI : 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199576081.001.0001

J. Et and D. Mookherjee, Institutional structure and the logic of ongoing collective enson B, 1987.

F. Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.72, issue.3, pp.351-379, 1958.
DOI : 10.2307/1882231

P. Beato, Issues and options on transnational projects, Integration and trade, 2008.

G. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.98, issue.3, pp.371-400, 1983.
DOI : 10.2307/1886017

M. Beesley and R. Hamilton, Small Firms' Seedbed Role and the Concept of Turbulence, The Journal of Industrial Economics, vol.33, issue.2, 1984.
DOI : 10.2307/2098510

J. Bendor, A. Et, and . Meirowitz, Spatial Models of Delegation, American Political Science Review, vol.3, issue.02, 2004.
DOI : 10.2307/2111156

B. Benson, W. Ergara, and . Henisz, Regulatory disequilibrium and inefficiency: the case of interstate trucking, eview of Austrian Economics tial deregulation and re-regulation : the isequilibrating nature of rent-seeking society dans the dynamics of intervention : regulation enson B. et M. Greenhut, 1986, Interest groups and the antitrust paradox Political institutions and electric utility investment: a crossesley T, Elected versus appointed regulators: theory and evidence, e Bijl P. et M. Peitz Dynamic regulation and entry in telecommunications markets: a ing Principles, CESifo Working Paper Series, pp.229-255, 1998.

B. Benson, Regulation, more Regulation, Partial Deregulation, and Reregulation: The Disequilibrating Nature of a Rent-Seeking Society, Advances in Austrian Economics, vol.8, pp.105-143, 2005.
DOI : 10.1016/S1529-2134(05)08005-1

J. Black, Constructing and contesting legitimacy and accountability in polcentric regulatory regimes, LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers, 2008.

S. Borner, A. Brunetti, and E. B. Weder, Political credibility and economic development, 1995.
DOI : 10.1007/978-1-349-24049-4

C. Boone, A. Et, and . Van-witteloostuijn, A unified theory of market partitioning: an integration of resource-partitioning and sunk cost theories, Industrial and Corporate Change, vol.13, issue.5, pp.701-725, 2004.
DOI : 10.1093/icc/dth028

H. , E. Faber, and T. Haaker, Balancing strategic interests for network value of tructure du marché et performance, Revue Economique de l, OCDE, vol.32, pp.111-158, 2004.

J. Raker, The historical development of the strategic management concept, Academy of reton A. et R. Wintrobe, 1980.

O. Boylaud, G. Et, and . Nicoletti, Le secteur des t??l??communications, Revue ??conomique de l'OCDE, vol.2001, issue.1, pp.219-224, 2001.
DOI : 10.1787/eco_studies-v2001-art4-fr

B. , C. University-rown, A. , J. Stern, B. Tenenbaum et al., Handbook for evaluating press. B infrastructure regulatory systems, 2006.

A. Brown, Evaluating infrastructure regulation: applying standards, norms and s, mimeo. assessing outcomes, TERI, 2007.

N. Bubnova, Guarantees and insurance for re-allocating and mitigating political and regulatory risks in infrastructure investment: market analysi, 1999.

J. Buchanan, G. Et, and . Tollock, The calculus of consent: logical foundations of constitutional democracy, 1962.
DOI : 10.3998/mpub.7687

S. Buehler, J. Et, and . Haucap, Mobile Number Portability, Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, vol.4, issue.3, pp.223-238, 2004.
DOI : 10.1023/B:JICT.0000047299.13443.5a

URL : http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.195.1991

L. Busenitz, C. Gomez, and J. Spencer, COUNTRY INSTITUTIONAL PROFILES: UNLOCKING ENTREPRENEURIAL PHENOMENA., Academy of Management Journal, vol.43, issue.5, pp.994-1003, 2000.
DOI : 10.2307/1556423

D. Carpenter, Adaptive Signal Processing, Hierarchy, and Budgetary Control in Federal Regulation, American Political Science Review, vol.30, issue.02, pp.283-303, 1996.
DOI : 10.2307/2110997

G. Carroll, Concentration and Specialization: Dynamics of Niche Width in Populations of Organizations, American Journal of Sociology, vol.90, issue.6, pp.1261-1283, 1985.
DOI : 10.1086/228210

G. Carroll, S. Dobrev, and A. Swaminathan, The evolution of organizational niches: U.S. automobile manufacturers 1885-1981, Administrative Science Quarterly, vol.47, pp.233-264, 2002.

M. Carter, J. Et, and . Wright, Interconnection in network industries, Review of Industrial Organization, pp.1-25, 1999.

M. Cave, I. Et, and . Vogelsang, How access pricing and entry interact, Telecommunications Policy, vol.27, issue.10-11, pp.717-728, 2003.
DOI : 10.1016/j.telpol.2003.08.004

J. Cawley, T. Et, and . Philipson, An Empirical Examination of Information Barriers to Trade in Insurance, American Economic Review, vol.89, issue.4, pp.827-846, 1999.
DOI : 10.1257/aer.89.4.827

R. Gilbert, The Role of Potential Competition in Industrial Organization, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol.3, issue.3, pp.107-127, 1989.
DOI : 10.1257/jep.3.3.107

J. M. Glachant, Y. Et, and . Perez, Institutional economics and network industries deregulatio policy, mimeo, 2007.

R. Gönenc, M. Maher, and G. Nicoletti, The Implementation and the Effects of Regulatory Reform: Past Experience and Current Issues, SSRN Electronic Journal, issue.32, 2001.
DOI : 10.2139/ssrn.238213

S. Greenstein, M. Et, and . Mazzeo, The role of differentiation strategy in local telecommunication entry and market evolution Protection for sale, Journal of Industrial Economics American Economic Review, vol.4, issue.84, pp.323-350, 1994.

P. Grout, The Cost of capital in regulated industries dans Bishop J. et C. Mayer regulatory challenge latory methodology: asset values and the cost of apital, dans the Financial methodology of incentive regulation: reconciling accounting and Grout P The Fondations of regu c economics, pp.386-407, 1995.

H. Gruber, F. Et, and . Verboven, The evolution of markets under entry and standards ), pp.1189-1204, 2001.

L. Grzybowski, Regulation of Mobile Telephony across the European Union: An Empirical Analysis, Journal of Regulatory Economics, vol.28, issue.1, pp.47-67, 2005.
DOI : 10.1007/s11149-005-2355-x

J. Guash, P. Et, and . Spiller, Managing the Regulatory Process: Design, concepts, Issues, and the Latin America and Caribbean Story Chapter, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the World Bank, 1999.
DOI : 10.1596/0-8213-4497-8

H. Gutierrez, Regulatory governance in the Latin American telecommunications sector, Utilities Policy, vol.11, issue.4, pp.185-244, 2003.
DOI : 10.1016/S0957-1787(03)00062-6

H. Gutierrez, The effect of endogenous regulation on telecommunications expansion and efficiency in Latin American telecommunications sector, Utilities Policy rulemaking: the President is no stranger ations regulation: current approaches with the end sight, mimeo. , Law, Legislation and liberty: volume I, Rules and Order, Policy OPP orking Paper Series, Federal Communications Commission American niversity Law Review, vol.11, issue.36, pp.225-240, 2003.

R. Hahn, The economics analysis of regulation: a response to the critics, p.1021, 2004.

R. Hahn and J. Burnett, Assessing regulatory impact analyses: the failure of agencies to comply with executive order 12, 2000.

J. Haring, Implications of asymmetric regulation for competition poli W, 1984.

J. Hausman and J. Sidak, tricity regulation Argentina and Chile, Telecommunic in Hayek F, pp.51-357, 1973.

D. Helm, British utility regulation, 1995.

W. Henisz, The Institutional Environment for Telecommunications Investment, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, vol.10, issue.1, pp.123-147, 2001.
DOI : 10.1162/105864001300122575

W. Et and B. Zelner, Explaining political hazards and safeguards: a transaction cost olitics approach, Industrial and Corporate Change 13: 901-15. multilateral influence on reform: the olitical backlash against private infrastructure investments, 2004.

J. Hertog, General theories of regulation, Encyclopaedia of Law and Economics, p.223, 1999.

A. Hillman, G. Et, and . Keim, International variation in the business-government interface: institutional and organizational considerations, Academy of Management Journal, vol.20, issue.1, 1995.

G. Holburn, P. Et, and . Spiller, Institutional or structural: lessons from international electricity sector reforms The Economics of Contracts: Theories and Applications, pp.463-502, 2002.

J. Huber, Delegation to civil servants in parliamentary democracies, European Journal of Political Research, vol.3, issue.3, pp.397-413, 2000.
DOI : 10.1111/1475-6765.00513

J. Huber, N. Et, P. Mccarty, J. Reform, C. Et et al., Bureaucratic Capacity Delegation The costs of control: legislators, agencies, and transaction Costs Politics, Delegation and bureaucracy, mimeo. 1999, Law and politics in judicial oversight of federal dministrative agencies, J. et C. Shipan Journal of Politics, vol.61, pp.207-220, 2000.

M. Humphries, D. Et, and I. Songer, MVNO The new deal, Digiworld focus, 2006.

S. Ikeda, J. Oliver, and E. Sepulveda, Dynamics of the mixed economy: towards a theory for interventionism The dynamics of interventionism: regulation and redistribution, Mixed tven H, 1997.

M. In, L. Holt, and S. Berg, Mechanisms to mitigate regulatory risk in private emison D The contributions of administrative science behaviour to strategic ohannsen K Regulatory Independence in Theory and Practice ? a Survey, 1981.

P. Joskow, R. Et, and . Noll, Regulation in theory and practice: an overview Studies in Public regulation, 1981.

P. Joskow, N. Et, and . Rose, Regulation and Deregulation after 25 Years: Lessons Learned for Research in Industrial Organization, ctricity distribution and ansmission networks, AEI working paper, pp.169-193, 1989.
DOI : 10.1007/s11151-004-7295-6

P. Joskow, Regulation and deregulation after 25 years: Le in, 2005.

P. Joskow, Incentive regulation in theory and practice : ele tr Josko Economics, 2005.

K. Judd, Credible Spatial Preemption, The RAND Journal of Economics, vol.16, issue.2, pp.153-166, 1985.
DOI : 10.2307/2555407

A. Kahn, Telecommunications: the transition from regulation to antitrust, pp.159-188, 2006.

J. Kalt, M. Et, and . Zupan, Capture theory and ideology in the economic theory of politics, American Economic Review, vol.74, issue.3, pp.279-300, 1984.

J. Kay, J. Et, and . Vickers, Regulatory Reform: An Appraisal Deregulation or Reregulation? Pinter, 1990.

M. Kerf, M. Schiffler, and C. Torres, Telecom regulators -converging trends, Public oup. Policy for the Private Sector, 2001.

C. Kerwin, Rulemaking: how government agencies write law and make policy, 1992.

R. Posner, Killing or Wounding to Protect a Property Interest, The Journal of Law and Economics, vol.14, issue.1, pp.201-233, 1971.
DOI : 10.1086/466708

R. Posner, Theories of economic regulation, Bell Journ M, 1974.

O. Quian, B. Et, and . Weingast, Federalism as a commitment to preser, 1997.

C. Radaelli, What does regulatory impact assessment mean in Europe ? AEI-Joint Center for regulatory Stu, 2005.

C. Reenock, Designing Cooperation: Agency Design, Credible Commitment and Regulatory Compliance, SSRN Electronic Journal, 2008.
DOI : 10.2139/ssrn.1127250

E. Romanelli and M. Tushman, Inertia, Environments, and Strategic Choice: A Quasi-Experimental Design for Comparative-Longitudinal Research, Management Science, vol.32, issue.5, pp.608-621, 1986.
DOI : 10.1287/mnsc.32.5.608

M. Rossi, A. Et, and . Estache, Regulatory agencies: impact on firm performance and social w, 2008.

D. Sappington, J. Et, and . Stiglitz, Public gulation: new perspectives on institutions and policies, pp.3-43, 1987.

P. Sarmento, A. Et, and . Brandão, Access pricing: A comparison between full deregulation and two alternative instruments of access price regulation, cost-based and retail-minus, Telecommunications Policy, vol.31, issue.5, pp.236-250, 2007.
DOI : 10.1016/j.telpol.2007.03.003

J. Woo, The role of policy and institutions for roductivity and firm dynamics: evidence from Micro and Industry Data, OECD Economics chankerman M Symmetric regulation for competitive telecommunications, cherer F. et D. Ross, Industrial market structure and economic performance T Scarpetta S., P. Hemmings, T. Tressel et p Department Working Papers 329, 1990.

B. Shaffer, Firm-level responses to government regulation: theoretical and re a, 1995.

W. Sharkey, Theory of natural monopoly, s and Informatics, vol.24, issue.2, pp.86-100, 1982.
DOI : 10.1017/CBO9780511571817

S. Shapiro, Assessing the benefits and costs of regulatory reforms: what questions need to be asked, AEI-brookings joint center for regulatory studies, pp.7-8, 2007.

D. Shin and M. Bartolacci, A Study of MVNO Diffusion and Market Structure in the EU, 2007.

F. Shubik, Voting, or a Price System in a Competitive Market Structure, American Political Science Review, vol.28, issue.01, pp.179-181, 1970.
DOI : 10.2307/1955622

W. Smith, Utility regulators -the independence debate, Public Policy for the Private Sector, 1997.

W. Smith, Utility regulators ? decision making structures, resources and start-up strategy, Public Policy for the Private Sector, 1997.

P. Smith, B. Et, and . Wellenius, Mitigating regulatory risk in telecommunications, Public olicy for the Private P Sector, 1999.

S. Ring, P. , G. Bigley, T. D-'aunno-et, and T. Khanna, PERSPECTIVES ON HOW GOVERMENTS MATTER., Academy of Management Review, vol.30, issue.2, pp.308-320, 2005.
DOI : 10.5465/AMR.2005.16387887

J. Spencer, T. Murtha, and S. Lenway, HOW GOVERNMENTS MATTER TO NEW INDUSTRY CREATION., Academy of Management Review, vol.30, issue.2, pp.321-337, 2005.
DOI : 10.5465/AMR.2005.16387889

P. Spiller, E. Et, and . Tiller, Decision Costs and the Strategic Design of Administrative Process and Judicial Review, The Journal of Legal Studies, vol.26, issue.2, pp.347-370, 1997.
DOI : 10.1086/467999

P. Spiller, M. Et, and . Tommasi, The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy: A Transactions Approach with Application to Argentina, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, vol.19, issue.2, pp.84-306, 2003.
DOI : 10.1093/jleo/ewg012

P. Spiller, M. Et, and . Tommasi, The Institutions of regulation, 2005.

P. Spiller, G. Et, . Van-den, and . Bergh, Toward A Positive Theory of State Supreme Court Decision Making, Business and Politics, vol.28, issue.01, pp.7-43, 2003.
DOI : 10.2307/1287860

P. Spiller, I. Et, and . Vogelsang, The institutional foundations of regulatory commitment in e UK (with special emphasis on telecommunications), mimeo, 1997.

D. Spulber, J. Et, and . Sidak, Network Access Pricing and Deregulation, Industrial and Corporate Change, vol.6, issue.4, pp.757-782, 1997.
DOI : 10.1093/icc/6.4.757

W. Tarbuck, Organizations as Action Generators, American Sociological Review, vol.48, issue.1, pp.91-102, 1983.
DOI : 10.2307/2095147

J. Et and J. Cubbin, Regulatory effectiveness: th S governance arrangements on electricity industry outcomes, Policy Research Working Pa eries 3536, 2005.

J. Stern, S. Et, and . Holder, Regulatory governance: criteria for assessing the performance of regulatory systems, Utilities Policy, vol.8, issue.1, pp.33-50, 1999.
DOI : 10.1016/S0957-1787(99)00008-9

J. Et and F. Trillas, Independence and discretion in telecommunications regulation: S lessons from independent central banks The theory of econo, Utilities Policy Management Science, vol.11, issue.2, pp.191-201, 1971.

G. Et and C. Friedland, What can regulators regulate? S of Law and Economics, pp.1-16, 1962.

C. Sunstein, Remaking Regulation, The American Prospect, vol.3, p.73, 1990.

J. Sutton, Sunk costs and market structure: price competition, advertising and the evolution of concentration, 1991.

J. Sutton, One Smart Agent, The RAND Journal of Economics, vol.28, issue.4, pp.605-628, 1997.
DOI : 10.2307/2555778

E. Rk-for, . Communications-access, T. Services-to-public, C. Et, and . Cambini, Investments and network competition, Rand Journal of cing: an overview for infrastructure d approach, 2005.

A. Swaminathan, Entry into new market segments in mature industries: endogenous and exogenous segmentation in the US brewing, 1998.

P. Teske, Interests and institutions in State regulati science, pp.139-154, 1991.

L. Tihanyi, D. Griffith, and C. Russell, The effect of cultural distance on entry mode choice, in International Business Studies, p.270, 2005.

M. Ting, The Power of the purse and Public Choice, pp.243-74, 2001.

R. Tollison, RENT SEEKING: A SURVEY, Kyklos, vol.27, issue.4, 1982.
DOI : 10.2307/3003249

G. Tullock, The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies and theft, Western Economic Journal, vol.5, pp.224-232, 1967.

T. Valletti, Obligations that can be imposed on operators with significant market power under the new regulatory framewo mobile networks, 2003.

T. Valletti, E. Et, and . Antonio, The theory of access pri regulators, Policy Research Working Paper Series, 1999.

V. Kotisaari, A. Maanavilja, P. Rauhala, and R. Svento, Measuring the success of telecom regulation: a balanced scorecar, 2005.

J. Vesa, The role of regulation in the evolution of mobile services industry, 2006.

I. Vogelsang, B. Et, and . Mitchell, Telecommunications competition: the last ten miles, Review of Industrial Organization, vol.12, pp.5-6, 1997.

G. Van-wangenheim, Production of legal rules by agencies and bureaucracies, Encyclopaedia of Law and economics, pp.560-586, 1999.

B. Weingast, Regulation, Reregulation, and Deregulation: The Political Foundations of Agency Clientele Relationships, Law and Contemporary Problems, vol.44, issue.1, pp.147-177, 1981.
DOI : 10.2307/1191389

B. Marshall, The industrial organization of Congress; or, why legislatures, pp.132-163, 1988.

B. Weingast, M. Et, and . Moran, Bureaucratic discretion or congressional control? Regulatory policy making by the Federal Trade Commission, 1983.

D. Weisman, Why less may be more under price-cap regulation, Journal of Regulatory Economics, vol.3, issue.3, 1994.
DOI : 10.1007/BF01418231

S. Winter and P. Et, Motivation for Compliance with Environmental Regulations, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, vol.70, issue.4, 2001.
DOI : 10.1002/pam.1023

S. Wright, R. Mason, and D. Miles, A study into certain aspects of the cost of capital for regulated utilities in the U, 2003.

D. Yoffie, Competing in the Age of Digital Convergence, California Management Review, vol.16, issue.4, pp.31-53, 1996.
DOI : 10.2307/1805621