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Architectures des FPGAs Asynchrones pour les Applications Cryptographiques

Abstract : Cryptography is a mean to defend against potential attackers, notably to protect confidentiality, integrity or secure authentication, whereas cryptanalysis is about the challenge to retrieve hidden information. No mathematical cryptanalysis method can decrypt modern cryptographic algorithms such as AES, DES. But the leak of information related to the workings of these machines, or manipulation of these machines to find the secret key has become a powerful means of cryptanalysis. These attacks are known as "Side-Channel Attacks". This thesis attempts to find answers to the following questions: * Is there an architecture whose information leakage does not allow the attacker to recover the key faster than the case where there is no leakage? * To what extent are this leakage is tolerable, and how can we maximize the use of these machines without compromising their secret? * What are the metrics to determine the vulnerability of electronic circuits facing a multitude of ways to attack? Recently numerous researchers have asked these questions for the various categories of electronic circuits. In this thesis we restrict our research space to FPGAs and Asynchronous Circuits. The main advantage of FPGAs is their reconfigurability, which can be used to adapt the algorithm against an attack. Asynchronous circuits have good properties such as tolerance to fault, the decorrelation of power consumption and computation, which are useful against Side-Channel Attacks.
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Contributor : Ecole Télécom ParisTech Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Friday, June 25, 2010 - 8:00:00 AM
Last modification on : Thursday, October 15, 2020 - 3:01:32 PM
Long-term archiving on: : Thursday, March 30, 2017 - 5:56:15 AM


  • HAL Id : pastel-00006190, version 1


Sumanta Chaudhuri. Architectures des FPGAs Asynchrones pour les Applications Cryptographiques. domain_other. Télécom ParisTech, 2009. Français. ⟨pastel-00006190⟩



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