La gouvernance locale face à l'incomplétude des contrats de délégation des services publics : l'exemple de l'eau et de l'assainissement

Abstract : Thanks a longitudinal study on 39 contracts in water and sewage utility, the author draws two models describing their progress. Whereas most contracts are dominated by opportunism, the most concerned organizations negotiate every few years with the firm in charge with the utility. As there is no other way to create the appropriate incitations in such an incomplete contract, negotiation skills should be developped. Organizations are all the more interested in appropriating a part of the social surplus because they face huge investment in plants. However, transaction costs have to be compared to expected gains.
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Submitted on : Wednesday, May 2, 2012 - 1:15:38 PM
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Florence Bonnet Beaugrand. La gouvernance locale face à l'incomplétude des contrats de délégation des services publics : l'exemple de l'eau et de l'assainissement. Gestion et management. École Nationale Supérieure des Mines de Paris, 2008. Français. ⟨NNT : 2008ENMP0005⟩. ⟨pastel-00693303⟩

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