Jeux répétés en réseaux et communication

Abstract : I study infinitely repeated games with imperfect private monitoring played on networks. Different networks may represent the structures of interaction, of monitoring, and of communication of the repeated game. Communication is costless, and may be either private or public. I study different models of repeated games, depending on the networks considered, on the nature of communication, and on the solution concept. The aim of this thesis is to establish necessary and sufficient conditions on the networks for a folk theorem to hold
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Marie Laclau. Jeux répétés en réseaux et communication. Gestion et management. HEC, 2012. Français. ⟨NNT : 2012EHEC0004⟩. ⟨pastel-00741919⟩

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