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Low-cost countermeasures against physical attacks on cryptographic algorithms implemented on altera FPGAs

Abstract : Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) and Fault Attacks (FA) are techniques to recover sensitive information in cryptographic systems by exploiting unintentional physical leakage, such as the power consumption. This thesis has two main goals: to draw a review of the state of the art of FPGA-compatible countermeasures against SCA and implement t the selected ones with the minimum area and performances overhead. Symmetrical algorithms, specially AES, are studied and several vulnerabilities of usual protections, namely Dual-rail with Precharge Logic (DPL) and masking are analysed, as well as the issue of performance and area overheads. In this context, three new countermeasures are considered: 1. Balance placement and routing (PAR) strategies aiming at enhancing existing DPLs robustness when implemented in modern FPGAs. 2. A new type of DPL called Balanced Cell-based Dual-railLogic (BCDL), to thwart most of the known DPL weaknesses. BCDL also possess a fault resilience mechanism and provides implementation optimisations on FPGA, achieving competitive performances and area overhead. 3. The Rotating S-Box Masking (RSM), a new masking technique for the AES that shows high leveles of robustness and performances while bringing a significant reduction of the area overhead. Finally, several new SCAs are presented and evaluated. Firstly the "Rank Corrector" a SCA enhancement algorithm. Secondly, The FPCA, introduces a novel SCA distinguisher based on the PCA. Then, combinations of either acquisition methods or SCA distinguishers are discussed and show significant decrease in the number of measurements required to perform a successful attack.
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Maxime Nassar. Low-cost countermeasures against physical attacks on cryptographic algorithms implemented on altera FPGAs. Other. Télécom ParisTech, 2012. English. ⟨NNT : 2012ENST0010⟩. ⟨pastel-00790669⟩

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