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. Le-cartel-n, est donc pas en mesure d'adopter à la fois une politique de prix limite et de maintenir dans tous les cas (pour tout Cf) sa stabilité vis à vis de la menace de défection, La libre entrée apparaît donc comme un facteur de déstabilisation de la coopération à la fois non négligeable et relativement robuste

. De, est croissante par rapport à q, ce qui signifie qu'à mesure que la concurrence s'intensifie à l'extérieur du cartel, le nombre de concurrents à l'intérieur de celui ci, optimalement désiré par la périphérie de la frange, devient grand. Ce qui apparaît donc déterminant, c'est la taille relative n/q. Quand cette taille devient grande, l'entrée de E ne profite plus à la firme (n+1) La figure IV

. Même-si-la-firme-périphérique, n) devient la firme la plus défavorisée avec l'entrée de la firme E dans le cartel, on montre à l'aide d'exemples, qu'elle peut elle aussi s'accommoder de cette entrée (améliorer son profit) à condition que la taille du cartel ne soit pas trop grande

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