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Towards a better formalisation of the side-channel threat

Abstract : In the field of the security of the embeded systems, it is necessary to know and understandthe possible physical attacks that could break the security of cryptographic components. Sincethe current algorithms such as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) are very resilient agaisntdifferential and linear cryptanalysis, other methods are used to recover the secrets of thesecomponents. Indeed, the secret key used to encrypt data leaks during the computation of thealgorithm, and it is possible to measure this leakage and exploit it. This technique to recoverthe secret key is called side-channel analysis.The main target of this Ph. D. manuscript is to increase and consolidate the knowledge onthe side-channel threat. To do so, we apply some information theoretic results to side-channelanalysis. The main objective is show how a side-channel leaking model can be seen as acommunication channel.We first show that the security of a chip is dependant to the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) ofthe leakage. This result is very usefull since it is a genereic result independant from the attack.When a designer builds a chip, he might not be able to know in advance how his embededsystem will be attacked, maybe several years later. The tools that we provide in this manuscriptwill help designers to estimated the level of fiability of their chips.
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Submitted on : Tuesday, February 26, 2019 - 5:53:05 PM
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  • HAL Id : tel-02050017, version 1



Eloi De Cherisey. Towards a better formalisation of the side-channel threat. Embedded Systems. Université Paris-Saclay, 2018. English. ⟨NNT : 2018SACLT016⟩. ⟨tel-02050017⟩



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