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Essays in industrial organization : competition and regulation in network industries

Abstract : In the first chapter of the thesis, I study how merger policy affects the choice between in-market and cross-border merging. An insight of the first chapter is that the merger policy should consider subsequent mergers triggered by an initial decision to merge, which here corresponds to the scenario of an exit-by-merger after a failed cross-border merger. In the second chapter of the thesis, I examine the impact of competition between a private firm and public firms on prices and investment in new infrastructures. An insight from this analysis is that due to distinct objective functions, the private firm charges the monopoly price when it is a monopoly, while the national public firm charges a price such that it cross-subsidizes between low-cost and high-cost areas. Local public firms charge prices contingent on the investment cost in their own area. In monopoly, the national public has the largest coverage, whereas the local public firms cover the same areas as the private firm. In mixed duopoly, prices are strategic complements for the private firm and are strategic substitutes for public firms. Competition leads the private firm to set lower prices, while public firms may charge higher prices. In the third chapter of the thesis, I investigate the impact of competition between two firms in prices and information disclosure levels. In a two-sided market, there are consumers on one side, and a monopoly data broker on the other side. An insight from this analysis is that firms adopt two types of business strategies due to a trade-off between the exploitation of consumer information, the level of information provision, and consumer valuations. If consumer valuations are sufficiently low, firms engage in disclosure of consumer information (low-privacy regime) and charge low (even negative) prices. In contrast, if consumer valuations are sufficiently high, firms do not engage in disclosure of consumer information (highprivacy regime) and always charge positive prices. If consumers single-purchase, a merger to monopoly increases market power but is privacy-neutral. With multi-purchasing, a merger to monopoly decreases prices and privacy levels if firms are unable to monetize multi-purchaser information.
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Jean-Marc Zogheib. Essays in industrial organization : competition and regulation in network industries. Economics and Finance. Institut Polytechnique de Paris, 2019. English. ⟨NNT : 2019IPPAT002⟩. ⟨tel-02481863⟩

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